BE PASSIVE / SITES
CONFIGURATION / EVIDENCE / DELIVERY

Civil maritime drone observation: requirements and acceptance

Lawful sensing, time alignment, alerts and replayable evidence, with explicit capability gaps and unexecuted tests.

21 October 2026 · evidence dataset 1.0.0

Read original evidenceDiscuss exact requirement

Purpose, boundaries and buyer inputs

For port and industrial site owners and civil integrators defining lawful observation, logging and alerts. No interference, takeover, attack or deployment promise. Existing avionics do not establish a drone-detection product.

Provide site permission, privacy boundaries, sensor inventory, lawful reference events, retention rules, budget and acceptance reviewer. Site, equipment, staffing, cost, schedule, API and licences are unconfirmed.

I / The specification below is proposed and executable once its prerequisites are provided. All simulation and physical pilot tests are NOT EXECUTED.

Five layers, explicit gaps

LayerEvidence / applicabilityGap
Drone DetectionNo 合機 (Hé Jī) detection-product evidence establishedSensor model, lawful collection, calibration and performance unknown
Mission ComputerNo board/OS/model selectedPower, memory, latency, cooling and isolation unknown
C2合機 (Hé Jī) GCS / Topology category (P2) SRC-17 · P2 · checked 2026-10-21 Observation console integration/API/permissions unverified; no takeover
RF合機 (Hé Jī) link category (P2) SRC-16 · P2 · checked 2026-10-21 Telemetry transport is not passive RF drone detection; exact model and local approvals unknown
Edge AINo model or dataset selectedLicence, evaluation set, false/missed alarms and offline limits unknown

Four proposed roles; no assigned staff

RoleResponsibilityHandoff
Site owner / operatorPermission, reference events, privacy and acceptance needsSite brief → integrator
Systems integratorInterfaces, configuration, logging and safe failure behaviourFrozen configuration → test lead
Research / test leadCalibration, ground truth and reproducible resultsSigned evidence package → independent reviewer
QA / delivery coordinatorTraceability, acceptance record and unresolved gapsReviewer decision → buyer; supply still subject to agreement

Doability and interface contract

AreaProposed contractUnknown / blocking input
Success conditionLawful observations are replayable; detection quality is measured, not claimedBuyer must pre-agree detection rate, nuisance-alarm rate and conditions
Version manifestsensor P/N+revision, calibration, firmware hash, OS/build, software commit, model hashAll exact values unknown; freeze before any execution
Input / outputJSONL events: event_id, sensor_id, track_id, timestamp_utc, timestamp_source, clock_offset_ms, confidence, class_or_unknown, raw_ref, config_hashProtocol/transport/rate unknown; agree adapter and time tolerance
Power / installationDocument voltage, peak/average power, mass, cooling, enclosure and mounting envelopeUnknown; measured at bench, never inferred from TOPS
Latency / memory / offlineMeasure end-to-end timestamps and peak memory; bounded local queue and explicit overflow policyLoad, capacity, delay budget and recovery target unset
Security / updatesLeast privilege; audit every acknowledgement and update; signed version and tested rollbackAuthentication design, key owner and patch responsibility unset
HBOM / SBOM / rightsVersioned hardware/software lists and model/data/code licences; lawful dataset approvalDocuments and contractual rights absent
Dependencies / cost / scheduleNo cost or duration commitment before scope and equipment reviewFour people are roles only; skills, assets, budget and site not assumed

Stage gates

StageEntryExit / next decision
Desktop / offlinePermission for shared non-sensitive data; named reviewerSchema, assumptions and requirements reviewed; unresolved fields flagged
SITL / replayFrozen fixture, versions and success thresholdsReplay tests T01–T05 reported; simulation is not physical validation
HIL / ground benchActual sensors, calibration, power and safe test setupTiming, resources, offline and access results recorded
Lawful controlled siteSite/privacy/operation permissions; trained personnel and safety planT07/T08 measured under stated conditions; reviewer accepts or requests correction

Tests and evidence files

ID / stageInputMethodPass conditionEvidenceExecution
T01 / desktopApproved mock observations + schemaValidate required UTC timestamp, sensor ID, track ID, uncertainty, model/config hash and raw-record referenceAll required fields and references validate; bad records rejectedschema-report.jsonNOT EXECUTED
T02 / offline replayFrozen lawful reference dataset; licence recordedReplay identical records twice and compare emitted event IDs, ordering and hashesDeterministic replay; all input records accounted forreplay-manifest.json + event-log.jsonlNOT EXECUTED
T03 / time alignmentKnown clock offsets inserted into a fixtureCheck declared timestamp source and offset detectionOffsets beyond pre-agreed tolerance flagged; no silent mergeclock-offset.csvNOT EXECUTED
T04 / link lossLocal network fixture; no field aircraftDisconnect uplink, fill bounded buffer, reconnectNo remote command generated; documented drop policy; replay without duplicate incident IDsnetwork-test.json + capture manifestNOT EXECUTED
T05 / accessRole matrix and test accountsAttempt unauthorized read, acknowledgement and updateUnauthorized operations rejected and audited; authorized path recordedaccess-report.jsonNOT EXECUTED
T06 / calibrationExact sensor, reference instrument and permissionsRecord calibration revision and environmental conditionsCalibration within buyer-agreed tolerance; expired calibration blocks acceptancecalibration.csvNOT EXECUTED
T07 / controlled sitePermitted site and ground-truth observation planRun labelled authorized reference events plus no-event periodsReport TP, FP, FN, observation hours and uncertainty; thresholds agreed before runground-truth.csv + confusion-report.jsonNOT EXECUTED
T08 / evidence handoffRead-only export and version manifestIndependent reviewer replays sample incidents and checks hashesNo missing raw refs; matching configuration and complete audithandoff-manifest.sha256NOT EXECUTED

Procurement and capability boundaries

The Reuters report is a deployment signal; the EU page is a policy source. Neither establishes a tender. No specific tender ID or project contract is verified.SRC-05 · S · checked 2026-10-21 SRC-06 · P1 · checked 2026-10-21 SRC-07 · P1 · checked 2026-10-21

Full research and procurement references →

Match the work to evidenced scope

CapabilityEvidenceOpen conditions / first deliverable
合機 (Hé Jī)P2: GNSS/RTK, IP Mesh/4G/5G links, GCS, payload categories and Topology. SRC-16 · P2 · checked 2026-10-21 SRC-17 · P2 · checked 2026-10-21 Model/revision, origin, firmware, endpoints, test report and current capacity unknown. Proposed first output: interface/configuration gap matrix.
Jing Mao / BYTE TCMP2: CNC machining and CMM. Displayed historical AS9100/ISO copies expired 2023-03-14; current validity unknown. SRC-21 · P2 · checked 2026-10-21 Drawing, material, tolerance, finish, quantity and acceptance required. Proposed first output: DFM questions and inspection-plan proposal. No electronics, motor or certified aircraft-part replacement established.
Brazil network referencesU: original product evidence not rechecked in this release. SRC-19 · I · checked 2026-10-21 SkyDrones, UAVI and Global Drones are research references. Data residency, complete BOM origin, price and availability remain unverified.

Alliance identity and project agreement are separate: 合機 (Hé Jī) takeover coordination and BYTE participation are user-confirmed. This work package has no confirmed supplier commitment.